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BIOSECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW*
Lawrence 0. Gostint & David P. Fidlert
I. INTRODUCTION
In the first five years of the twenty-first century, the United States
and the rest of the world have experienced shocks, crises, and fears captured
in the haunting images, words, and events that define our turbulent times:
September 11 th, Al Qaeda, anthrax, weapons of mass destruction, smallpox,
axis of evil, SARS, quarantine, enemy combatants, USA PATRIOT Act,
HIV/AIDS, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib. The troubling lexicon of the
early twenty-first century captures the pressing dangers individuals, coun-
tries, and the international system face today.
Some of these dangers are not new, such as war, tyranny, and tor-
ture. They represent recent manifestations of age-old threats to human dig-
nity, national security, and international peace. Other dangers combine,
however, to create new threats that have few, if any, precedents. This article
focuses on one of these new dangers-the threat infectious diseases pose to
human life, the security of States, and international political and economic
stability. In short, the world confronts a serious biosecurity threat.
The argument that something called "biosecurity" has newly
emerged on national and international political agendas may initially be
greeted with skepticism because biological warfare and infectious diseases
were international issues for most of the twentieth century.' The Geneva
Protocol, for example, banned the use of bacteriological agents in warfare in
- This article draws on DAVID P. FIDLER & LAWRENCE 0. GOsTIN, BIOSECURITY IN THE
GLOBAL AGE: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2007) (forth-
coming). Dean Gostin gave the keynote address on Biosecurity Under the Rule of Law at the
Symposium on The Fifth Plague: A Unique Counterterrorism Simulation, at the Case West-
ern Reserve School of Law on March 31, 2006. The authors acknowledge the research and
editorial assistance of Benjamin Berkman, Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center; and
Deborah Rubbens, Research Assistant, Georgetown University Law Center.
t Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Professor
of Public Health, the Johns Hopkins University; Director, Center for Law and the Public's
Health (CDC and WHO Collaborating Center).
I Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow at Indiana University School of
Law, Bloomington, Indiana; Senior Scholar, Center for Law and the Public's Health (CDC
and WHO Collaborating Center).
1 See generally MEDICINE AT THE BORDER: DISEASE, GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY, 1850
TO THE PRESENT (Alison Bashford ed., 2006) (describing issues of border control and infec-
tious diseases in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries).
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1925.2 States established international health organizations tasked with in-
ternational control of infectious diseases in the first decade of the twentieth
century. In addition, international cooperation on infectious diseases dates
back to at least the mid-nineteenth century.4
The emergence of biosecurity as a policy concern connects to his-
torical efforts with respect to biological weapons and infectious disease
epidemics. What has transpired recently, however, represents a policy revo-
lution, the implications of which are still unfolding and are not yet fully
understood. So much of such importance has happened so rapidly with re-
spect to bioterrorism and infectious diseases that synthesis presents a daunt-
ing challenge. This article takes up the challenge and explores the emer-
gence of biosecurity as a critical area of policy in the early twenty-first cen-
tury, paying particular attention to biosecurity's relationship with the rule of
law.
II. BIOSECURITY BASICS: DEFINITION AND DIFFICULTIES
A. Defining Biosecurity
We define "biosecurity" as society's collective responsibility to
safeguard the population from dangers presented by pathogenic microbes-
whether naturally occurring or intentionally released. Traditionally, experts
have used the term to describe efforts to defend against biological weapons
and biological terrorism. However, our concept of biosecurity is broader,
recognizing not only the dangers of biological weapons but also of naturally
occurring infectious diseases. The threats presented by biological weapons
and natural disease epidemics weave together to form an interdependent
policy challenge the likes of which we have never seen before.
This interdependency does not mean that all outbreaks are biosecu-
rity problems. Many disease outbreaks remain localized and low impact
events that societies take in stride. The biosecurity concern is with natural or
2 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature, June 17,
1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
3 The following international health organizations were established in the first twenty-five
years of the twentieth century: Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (1902), Office International
d'Hygi~ne Publique (1907), and Health Organization of the League of Nations (1923). See
generally INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, 1918-1939 (Paul
Weindling ed., 1995).
4 See generally Norman Howard-Jones, Origins of International Health Work, 1 BRrr.
MED. J. 1032 (1950); NEVILLE M. GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS AND
THEIR WORK (2d ed. 1971); NORMAN HOWARD-JONES, THE SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SANITARY CONFERENCES 1851-1938 (1975); Alexandra Minna Stem and
Howard Markel, International Efforts to Control Infectious Diseases, 1851 to Present, 292
JAMA 1474 (2004).
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intentional epidemics that have the potential to disrupt the normal function-
ing of societies. Societal disruption is not, of course, a concept capable of
precise measurement or prediction because too many factors are involved.
Infectious disease outbreaks have a particularly powerful effect on the hu-
man psyche that extends beyond morbidity and mortality statistics. 5 Even
harms that are comparatively small statistically can have profoundly desta-
bilizing effects. The social, economic, and political disruptions to societies
caused by the anthrax attacks in 2001 and the outbreaks of severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 illustrate the dangerous disruptive po-
tential of even comparatively low mortality events.6 The acute devastation
caused by HIV/AIDS in the developing world,7 the smallpox vaccination
campaign in 2003-2004, 8 and the mobilization of resources to prevent and
control highly pathogenic influenza,9 also illustrate the social, political, and
economic dimensions of disease threats.
5 See, e.g., Hector W.H. Tsang et al., Psychosocial Impact of SARS, 7 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1326 (2004) (noting the "social and psychological problems" associ-
ated with SARS).
6 Opening Remarks by Dr Richard Nesbit, WHO Acting Regional Director for the West-
em Pacific during the First Meeting of the Asian Pacific Technical Advisory Group on
Emerging Infectious Diseases, July 18, 2006, available at http://www.wpro.who.int/reg
ional director/speeches/speech_20060718.htm ("SARS was unique in the panic and fear that
it caused, buckling economies and crippling international trade and travel. The economic
costs were estimated at perhaps up to US$100 billion."); Elin Gursky, Thomas V. Inglesby,
and Tara O'Toole, Anthrax 2001: Observations on the Medical and Public Health Response,
1 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE AND SCIENCE 97
(2003).
7 See, e.g., Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS [UNAIDS], 2006 Report on
the Global AIDS Epidemic), available at http://www.unaids.org/en/HIV-data/2006Global
Report/default.asp.
8 COMMITTEE ON SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, THE SMALLPOX
VACCINATION PROGRAM: PUBLIC HEALTH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2005); Edward P. Rich-
ards, Katharine C. Rathbun & Jay Gold, The Smallpox Vaccination Campaign of 2003: Why
Did it Fail and What Are the Lessons for Bioterrorism Preparedness?, 64 LA. L. REV. 851
(2003).
9 Congress recently appropriated $3.8 billion dollars to address pandemic influenza.
Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in
the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat.
2680, 2782-87 (2005). To meet the costs estimated by the World Bank to contain avian
influenza, donor countries recently pledged $1.9 billion. World Bank, Avian and Human
Influenza: Financing Needs and Gaps (2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/PROJECTS/2015336-1135192689095/20766293/AHIFinancingGAPSFINAL 12-21 .pdf;
International Pledging Conference on Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza, Be'ing Decla-
ration (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-
1136754783560/beijingdeclaration.pdf
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B. Difficulties with Assessing Biosecurity Threat and Risk
Biological threats pose fundamental challenges to governments and
populations in every region of the globe. These challenges explain why the
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General argued that, in reforming the
United Nations for the twenty-first century, "[w]e need to pay much closer
attention to biological security."10 This task is, however, complicated by the
difficulty of assessing the risk associated with events that have a low prob-
ability of occurring but can lead to potentially enormous adverse conse-
quences.11
Frightening analyses of what might happen abound. Government
modeling or "tabletop" exercises simulating biological attacks in the United
States-such as Dark Winter (smallpox) and TOPOFF (plague)-revealed
serious weaknesses in public health preparedness that could contribute to
potentially devastating harm. 12 Both exercises predicted large-scale morbid-
ity and fatalities from a biological attack. The World Health Organization
(WHO) concluded that the aerosolized release of Yersiniapestis over a large
city would cause 150,000 cases of pneumonic plague. 3 A Congressional
analysis found that a similar release of one hundred kilograms of aerosol-
ized anthrax would result in up to three million deaths. 14 Pandemic influ-
10 THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY-
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES, AND
CHANGE viii (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/.
u See Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far are Limitations
on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
12 In one exercise conducted in 2001, code-named "Dark Winter," smallpox were released
in shopping malls in Oklahoma City, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. Three thousand people were
supposed to have been initially infected. About two weeks after the attacks, it was estimated
that sixteen thousand cases of smallpox would have been reported in twenty-five different
states, with ten other countries reporting cases. Tara O'Toole et al., Shining Light on "Dark
Winter, " 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 972, 979 (2002). Similarly, in another exercise,
code-named "Top Official," or "TOPOFF," the federal government and the states modeled
the effects of an intentional dispersal of plague. The scenario involved the release of an aero-
sol of Yersinia pestis in Denver, Colorado. By six days after the release of the plague, esti-
mates of those with pneumonic plague ranged from 3,700 to more than 4,000, and between
950 and 2000 deaths were estimated. Thomas V. Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City:
Observations from TOPOFF, 32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 436 (2001).
13 Thomas V. Inglesby, Plague as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Man-
agement, 283 JAMA 2281 (2000) ("The World Health Organization concluded that, worst-
case scenario, if fifty kilograms of Yersinia pestis (the organism that causes the plague) were
released as an aerosol over a city of five million people, 150,000 could develop pneumonic
plague, and 36,000 of those may die.").
14 U.S. CONG., OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559, at 54 (U.S. Gov't Printing Off., 1993), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/OTA 1/DATA/1993/9341 .PDF.
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enza estimates of morbidity and mortality have been similarly unimagin-
able.
Immediately underneath these scary numbers lurk difficult ques-
tions that defy easy answers. Which biological agents are readily available
to terrorists? How hard is it for a terrorist to "weaponize" such agents and
disseminate them effectively? Will the avian influenza virus (H5N1) mutate
into a virulent strain capable of sustained human-to-human transmission?
These highly contingent questions are answered only with great difficulty or
not at all. Scholars and policy makers, accustomed to policy analysis de-
rived from risk-benefit ratios, are being forced to make decisions at a time
when such ratios cannot easily be calculated. In addition, far-reaching
changes in ecological, technological, economic, and political dimensions at
the national and international levels have reshaped risk perceptions with
respect to potential biological threats.15
The difficulties of risk assessment are particularly acute with re-
spect to bioterrorism. An effective bioterrorist attack with a contagious
agent could have a major impact on public health, health care systems, eco-
nomic well-being, and politics. Morbidity and mortality could be signifi-
cant, the economy would suffer, the health care system would be stressed by
the need for medicines, medical equipment, personnel, hospitals, and quar-
antine facilities. Those who are ill or quarantined would be unable to work,
take care of their children, or participate in normal daily life. Confidence in
political leaders and the political system might plummet, perhaps creating
conditions conducive for civil unrest. Although very low probability events,
acts of bioterrorism contain the potential for such adverse consequences that
policy makers ignore them at their peril.
The actual and potential burden of naturally occurring infectious
diseases is better understood, but this knowledge has not necessarily trans-
lated into better security against such diseases. Communicable diseases still
represent one of the greatest burdens of morbidity and mortality globally,
especially in the developing world.16 Malaria, tuberculosis, and H1V/AIDS
alone account for six million deaths every year. 17 Endemic diseases have re-
15 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE COMMITTEE ON MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH IN THE
21ST CENTURY, MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH: EMERGENCE, DETECTION, AND RESPONSE 19
(Mark S. Smolinski, Margaret A. Hamburg, & Joshua Lederberg, eds.) (2003) ("The in-
creasingly interconnected and fast-paced world of transcontinental commerce and interna-
tional travel has made any nation susceptible to the infectious diseases that occur incessantly
outside its borders. Infectious diseases today ignore geographic and political boundaries, and
thus constitute a global threat that puts every nation and every person at risk.") [hereinafter
MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH].
16 See id. at21.
17 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GLOBAL HEALTH: THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT
AIDS, TB, AND MALARIA IS RESPONDING TO CHALLENGES BUT NEEDS BETTER INFORMATION
AND DOCUMENTATION FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED FUNDING 5-6 (2005).
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emerged in more virulent, multi-drug resistant forms (e.g., HIV/AIDS, ma-
laria, and tuberculosis).18 Diseases once endemic only in the Third World
have arrived in the First World (e.g., West Nile virus and monkeypox).
Emerging infections have been newly identified in humans (e.g., viral hem-
orrhagic fevers, HJV/AIDS, and SARS) and animals (e.g., bovine spongi-
form encephalopathy), some with devastating consequences for world
health, world trade, and tourism. Diseases have even jumped species, caus-
ing loss both in animal and human populations (e.g., avian influenza). 19
The emergence and re-emergence of naturally occurring infectious
diseases in the last twenty to thirty years are directly linked to the complex
web of ecological, technological, economic, and political changes that have
characterized world politics in the recent past.20 The scale, scope, and com-
plexity of the problem, combined with high levels of unpredictability (e.g.,
when will pandemic influenza strike again?), make governance of naturally
occurring infectious diseases difficult on both a national and global scale.
In these difficult policy environments, there is a great temptation to
believe that past, current, and future progress on biotechnology and modem
medicine better prepares societies for biosecurity threats. Although such
progress is important, science alone will not deliver better biosecurity for
countries and peoples. The factors driving increased concern about bioter-
rorism and the emergence and spread of infectious diseases are not amena-
ble to medicalization.
Indeed, even modem advances in biotechnology are not unequivo-
cally helpful. As the scientific community better understands the biology of
pathogens and methods of manipulating microbial life forms, this knowl-
edge can fall into the wrong hands and help facilitate the ability of govern-
ments and terrorist groups to explore pathogens and their malevolent use.21
Individual nations and the international community must, therefore, wrestle
with hard problems related to the management of scientific advances.
III. RETHINKING BIOSECURITY POLICY: FOUR THEMES
The upheaval caused by biological hazards has revealed that indi-
vidual states and the international community are not well prepared to pre-
vent such hazards and, if necessary, effectively respond. Societies are now
18 World Health Organization, Drug Resistance, http://www.who.int/drugresistance/en/
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (noting that many diseases, including malaria, tuberculosis, and
HIV/AIDS have developed strains which have proven resistant to first-line medications).
19 See John H. Beigel et al., Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Infection in Humans, 353 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1374, 1378 (2005).
20 MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH, supra note 15, atpassim.
21 See generally COMM. ON ADVANCES IN TECH. AND THE PREVENTION OF THEIR
APPLICATION TO NEXT GENERATION BIOWARFARE THREATS, GLOBALIZATION, BIOSECURITY,
AND THE FUTURE OF THE LIFE SCIENCES (2006).
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caught between the stale assumptions and policy inertia of past approaches
and the uncertainties inherent in dramatically changing policy strategies.
The seriousness and complexity of the biosecurity challenge requires fun-
damentally rethinking the manner in which the dangers of biological weap-
ons and naturally occurring diseases should be approached. In our forthcom-
ing book, Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological Weapons, Public
Health, and the Rule of Law, we identify four themes that we believe char-
acterize the policy challenges biosecurity presents now and in the foresee-
able future.
First, the policy revolution that biosecurity represents requires the
integration of two policy realms previously separate from each other-
security and public health. Integrating security and public health requires
changing entrenched perspectives and practices in both areas and building
new, sustainable governance approaches to the threats posed by pathogenic
microbes.
Second, the nature of the biosecurity challenge requires supervision
of the biological sciences as part of the integration of security and public
health. The need for heightened supervision of science flows from the wor-
ries about malevolent actors transforming scientific advances into weapons
of mass terror and destruction. The dynamics of such supervision cannot,
however, sacrifice science's critical role in improving humanity's health on
the altar of narrowly construed notions of national security.
Third, the integration of security and public health and the supervi-
sion of science must occur within the context of globalization, which re-
quires globalizing governance for biosecurity. As with many policy areas
penetrated and transformed by globalization, security and public health can
no longer view the world through the state-centric lens of national govern-
ments and intergovernmental coordination.
Fourth, we argue that moving towards the integration of security
and public health, the supervision of science, and globalized forms of gov-
ernance must be informed by, and take place within, the rule of law. In the
highly uncertain and contingent context of biosecurity, we assert that the
rule of law philosophy of governance provides a tested methodology for
policy formulation and execution that allows material interests to be pur-
sued without losing sight of core normative values.
Our book analyzes each of these themes in detail, and demonstrates
the importance of viewing them as interdependent policy tasks. Here, we
briefly outline the first three themes in more detail before turning, in the last
part of the article, to the challenge of ensuring that biosecurity policy is
embedded in the rule of law.
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A. The Integration of Security and Public Health: From Silos to Syn-
ergies
The development of the policy area known as biosecurity flows
from the collision of two policy spheres-public health and security-
previously not connected or related. The distance between security policy
and public health activities is reflected in foreign policy conceptualizations
of security as representing "high politics" and of international health as fal-
ling within the category of "low politics. '22 Even within the realm of "low
politics," public health was at the margins because it was largely considered
a technical, non-political, and humanitarian endeavor. The gap that existed
between public health and the theory and practice of national and interna-
23tional security was enormous.
The manner in which states traditionally approached the threat of
biological weapons demonstrated no serious consideration of the theory and
practice of public health. States addressed biological weapons through clas-
sical arms control mechanisms, 24 but ignored public health considerations
and strategies should arms control fail to prevent the use of biological
weapons. If public health factored at all in biological arms control, it was as
a source of friction. International legal prohibitions on biological weapons
development could not outlaw peaceful research on, and uses of, biological
agents because such activities were necessary for health purposes, namely
basic scientific research on pathogens and applied research on drugs and
vaccines.
21
Similarly, national and international public health systems operated
without serious reference to security concerns about biological weapons.
States never applied the main international legal regime for infectious dis-
ease control-the International Health Regulations-in ways supportive of
the control of biological weapons. Nor were national and international pub-
lic health systems and resources designed or applied with the threat of bio-
logical weapons in mind.
22 See David P. Fidler, Health as Foreign Policy: Between Principle and Power, 6
WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT'L REL. 179, 180-82 (2005).
23 DAVID P. FIDLER, HEALTH AND FOREIGN POLICY: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW (2005).
24 See generally Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous, or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, supra note 2; Con-
vention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, G.A. Res. 2826 (XXVI), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2826 (Feb. 25, 1972).
25 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, art. I(1) (allowing
the development and production of microbial or other biological agents or toxins in types and
quantities that have justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes).
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National security and public health, then, have operated in two par-
allel worlds-security was highly politicized and generously funded, while
public health was politically neglected and starved of resources. This sepa-
ration is no longer tenable. The scientific, political, and moral restraints that
made state use of biological weapons during the Cold War unlikely do not
necessarily have the same strength in the post-Cold War era. Non-state ac-
tors, moreover, seem even less likely to abide by international rules on the
development and use of biological weapons. 26 For rogue states and non-
state actors, the scientific challenges of producing biological weapons are
receding with rapid advancements in microbiology and their global dis-
semination.
At the same time, the resurgence of naturally occurring infectious
diseases is creating new understandings about how to think about security.
The H1V/AIDS pandemic made the international community face the reality
of microbial-related destruction of populations, economies, development
prospects, and military power. These came to be seen as having not just
public health, but national security implications. 27 More recently, the politi-
cal and socioeconomic consequences of SARS and avian influenza opened
the eyes of political leaders to the security implications of infectious dis-
eases. In its latest National Security Strategy, the Bush administration, for
example, declared that it recognized "[p]ublic health challenges like pan-
demics (HIV/AIDS, avian influenza) that recognize no borders" as a na-
tional security problem related to globalization.28
What does it mean to suggest that public health and national secu-
rity must be transformed from separate policy silos to governance synergy?
It means fundamental changes in both security and public health systems, as
well as new connections between them. Expanding the concept of security
to include infectious disease threats requires substantial strengthening of the
public health infrastructure within and among countries. It makes little sense
to invest significantly in national and international security concerning bio-
logical threats without scaling up investments in public health systems. In-
vestments in laboratories, surveillance, data systems, and public health
workforce often produce dual use capabilities that permit us to shield
26 See Reducing the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. 54-56 (2002) (prepared statement of Amy Sands,
Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies) (discussing the potential threat of bioterrorism from non-state actors).
27 See, e.g., LAURIE GARRETT, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. REP., HIV and National Security:
Where are the Links?, at 55 (2005); Harvey Feldbaum, Kelley Lee & Preeti Patel, The Na-
tional Security Implications ofHIV/AIDS, 3 PLoS MEDICINE 774,774-75 (2006).
28 The WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 47 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ncs/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf.
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against bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious diseases.29 Security
and public health both must move sustainably to the realm of high resources
and high politics. Public health, for its part, can no longer maintain the
stance of separation from security policy and power politics. What public
health does matters politically to states and the international community. It
deserves to be on the agenda of political leaders at the national and global
level.
The integration of security and public health means that policies
and practices have to flow more seamlessly. Governance and financing
structures must be harmonized. When planning and operating biosecurity
policy, all relevant agencies have to be well represented: national security,
law enforcement, emergency management, and public health. These agen-
cies at the national and international level have to find ways to share data,
pool resources, and make decisions cooperatively. Shorn of the weight of
history and protection of bureaucratic turf, biosecurity policy should blend
the strengths of security and public health endeavors into a strong force
united for the common good.
B. The Supervision of Science: The Conundrum of Biosecurity and
Scientific Freedom
The scientific enterprise generally, and in public health specifically,
has embraced a number of inter-related principles: the importance of scien-
tific innovation, the need for scientific freedom, and the value of open dis-
semination of scientific ideas. The first principle holds that scientific inno-
vation should be encouraged. Such encouragement means not only funding
scientific research, but also welcoming the rich diversity of ideas that may
lead to discoveries. Society benefits from a full spectrum of scientific
knowledge, even if it was often unsure where such knowledge would lead.
In this way, a thriving marketplace of ideas develops, where the best con-
cepts flourish for the public good.
But, it has always been known that even the most benevolently in-
tended scientific research could lead to dreadful, fearsome results. Think
about the dual uses for nuclear research, which bring not only peaceful en-
ergy but also the tools (and temptation) to develop weapons of mass de-
struction. The current standoff between the UN Security Council and Iran
over Iran's nuclear activities powerfully illustrates this tension.30 Beyond
29 See Christopher Chyba, Toward Biological Security, 81(3) FOREIGN. AFF. May-June
2002, at 122-24 (noting the U.S. response to anthrax attacks included strategies such as
stockpiling vaccines and improving local and national disease surveillance).
30 See generally Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council De-
mands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August, or Face Possible Economic, Diplo-
matic Sanctions, U.N. Doc SC/8792 (July 31, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm.
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nuclear research, society continues to struggle with the conundrums created
by the pull of scientific investigation and the prospect of such investigation
producing horrific consequences. The controversy over the destruction of
the only known specimens of the smallpox virus in the United States and
Russia highlights the dilemma-which is more important, the search for
knowledge of the variola virus' secrets or the potential for dangerous misuse
of the virus?
3 1
Today, the science/security problem arises in the context of re-
search relating to a wide array of pathogens and biotechnologies. Scientific
investigations are needed to continue the flow of creative ideas that inform
the basic understanding of the microbial world and the development of po-
tentially life-saving vaccines and pharmaceuticals. At the same time, this
research can fall into the wrong hands, providing a tool for threats to our
health and security. This double-edged problem raises the need for height-
ened supervision of the biological sciences as an aspect of biosecurity.
The second principle is scientific freedom. Related to scientific in-
novation, many societies have tried to nurture an environment of scientific
inquiry and exploration. We have generally been loath to overly regulate the
biological sciences because such oversight can deter creativity and chill the
scientific spirit. So powerful is the idea of scientific freedom that it has been
embraced as an important form of freedom of expression, constitutionally
protected in the United States, valued in most liberal democracies, and ex-
pressed in international human rights norms. Scientific freedom appears to
give researchers full permission to delve into any area of exploration, re-
gardless of the motivation of the scientist or the potential uses of discoveries
by others. The need for supervision of the biological sciences as an element
of biosecurity policy changes the traditional dynamic supported by the prin-
ciple of scientific freedom.
The third principle is open dissemination of scientific ideas. Under
this practice, scientists are not only free to think and innovate, but they are
also free to discuss and publish. The idea of open dissemination is given life
through presentation of research at scientific gatherings, publication in peer
reviewed journals, private communications with individuals, organizations,
or even governments, or posting data on a website or distributing it widely
through electronic means.
Open dissemination is vital for science. It allows for the propaga-
tion of the ideas and means by which scientists replicate, improve on, or
repudiate existing research. It is also a means by which scientists can (inad-
vertently or intentionally) convey vital information to those who would use
31 See generally DAVID A. KOPLOW, SMALLPOX: THE FIGHT TO ERADICATE A GLOBAL
SCOURGE (2003) (analyzing the controversy over what to do with the last remaining research
stocks of the smallpox virus).
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the knowledge to harm others. If all scientific knowledge is truly open, then
it becomes much easier for terrorists and rogue states to acquire the infor-
mation needed to pursue malevolent objectives. The rise of biosecurity con-
cerns has made many people, including those who conduct scientific re-
search, rethink the implications of the principle of open dissemination of
scientific research. This rethinking feeds into the perceived need for height-
ened supervision of the biological sciences.
Finding the right balance between scientific innovation, freedom,
and openness, on the one hand, and biosecurity supervision, on the other, is
fraught with difficulty. It is a conundrum that has no obvious or clear an-
swer. Yet, the realities of modem society require a careful calibration of
science and security that allows for a reasonable measure of security while
still not trampling on the freedoms and traditions of scientists, which have
contributed much to human well-being.
Appropriate supervision will involve many facets, including im-
proved security for pathogen handling and transfer, laboratory safety and
security, scrutiny of types of research considered particularly dangerous,
and sometimes restraint in publishing research findings. It will require look-
ing for helpful models in other policy areas that also attempt to balance se-
curity and the achievement of other social goals. These models might in-
clude attributes such as transparency, non-discrimination, fairness, and ac-
countability. In addition, the supervision of the biological sciences should
be guided by the principle that any restrictions on scientific activity should
be no more restrictive than necessary to achieve the objective of ensuring
biosecurity.
C. The Globalization of Biosecurity
1. From Sovereignty to Globalized Governance
We argue that a third challenge is achieving globalized governance
against biosecurity threats. The threats of biological weapons proliferation,
biological attack, and infectious disease outbreaks exist in a world domi-
nated by sovereign states and political borders. However, the global govern-
ance challenge arises because humanity must confront the borderless nature
of terrorism, scientific advance, and pathogenic microbes.
Our emphasis on the need for globalized governance in biosecurity
does not, of course, mean that the worlds of security and public health are
strangers to the effects of globalization. The "globalization of public health"
is, for example, not new, especially with respect to infectious diseases.
Classic public health mantras include "germs don't recognize borders" and
"germs don't carry passports." Public health has long understood the role
that international mobility of people and goods plays in spreading patho-
genic microbes around the planet and that the division of humanity into
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territorial sovereign states rarely, if ever, materially slows infectious disease
spread.32
Unfortunately, national sovereignty and borders do matter when it
comes to the governance functions public health must undertake (e.g., sur-
veillance, intervention). Governance of health threats arising in the border-
less microbial world takes place in a border-filled political world that frag-
ments jurisdiction over virtually all essential public health activities. For the
integration of security and public health and the supervision of science, this
fragmentation poses difficulties.
Such fragmented governance could only be ameliorated through in-
ternational cooperation and, to be sure, the international community has
tried to cooperate on matters of security and public health. We mentioned
earlier the traditional approach of arms control agreements with respect to
the threat of biological weapons. The origins of international collaboration
on naturally occurring infectious diseases date back to the first International
Sanitary Conference, held in Paris in 185 1.3 3 These efforts included several
international sanitary conventions in the latter half of the 19th century, to-
gether with the formation of regional and international institutions in the
early 20th century to oversee these conventions.3 The formation of the
World Health Organization (WHO) in 194835 and the promulgation of the
International Sanitary Regulations in 195 136 -which later were renamed the
International Health Regulations in 1969 (IHR 1969) 37-were seminal in
consolidating international governance mechanisms on public health.
Even though states have engaged in international cooperation on
biological weapons and infectious diseases, the results have been disap-
pointing. The BWC is often considered the weakest of the arms control trea-
ties addressing weapons of mass destruction. The HR covered only a hand-
ful of infectious diseases. For example, after the eradication of smallpox in
the late 1970s, the IHR 1969 only applied to cholera, plague, and yellow
fever-the same diseases originally discussed at the first International Sani-
tary Conference in 1851. Even within this narrow reach, the HR 1969
32 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, THE IMPACT OF
GLOBALIZATION ON INFECTIOUS DISEASE EMERGENCY AND CONTROL: EXPLORING THE
CONSEQUENCES AND OPPORTUNITIES 2-4 (Stacey Knobler et al. eds., 2002).
33 See, e.g., Stem & Markel, supra note 4, at 1475.
34 See generally DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES 26-47
(1999) (surveying these international legal efforts).
35 Constitution of the WHO, July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 (entered into
force Apr. 7, 1948).
36 Int'l Sanitary Regulations-WHO Regulations No. 2, adopted May 25, 1951, 175
UNTS 215 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1952).
37 Int'l Health Regulations, adopted July 25, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 3003, 764 U.N.T.S. 3 (en-
tered into force Jan. 1, 1971) [hereinafter Int'l Health Regulations].
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failed to achieve its objectives because states parties violated its rules with
impunity.
38
The need for, and importance of, globalized forms of governance
for biosecurity purposes are reflected in the revised IHR, adopted by the
World Health Assembly in May 2005 (IHR 2005)."9 The IHR 2005 radically
departs from past approaches by expanding the scope of the Regulations to
cover pathogenic threats whatever their origin, integrating non-state actors
into global surveillance, incorporating human rights principles, imposing
significant obligations concerning surveillance and response, and establish-
ing new powers for WHO.40 Many obstacles need to be overcome before the
global governance mechanisms present in the HR 2005 are effective, espe-
cially given the lack of resources currently available to assist developing
countries in improving and sustaining the public health surveillance and
intervention capacities required by the IHR 2005.
Efforts to strengthen the BWC have not, however, advanced as well
as the revision of the IHR did. The attempt to create a verification mecha-
nism in the form of a BWC Protocol failed in 2001 when the Bush admini-
stration rejected the proposed draft negotiating text.4' This failure, com-
bined with concerns about biological weapons development or acquisition
by terrorist groups, has led to controversy about the future of the BWC's
arms control approach.
Emerging out of this controversy are four policy trends that charac-
terize the new world of biological weapons governance: (1) efforts to crimi-
nalize in international law the development and use of biological weapons;
(2) increased regulation of the biological sciences; (3) renewed interest,
particularly in the United States, in reinvigorated biological defense re-
search; and (4) the realization that public health infrastructures are national
and homeland security assets and must be improved in case biological at-
tacks occur. As we explore in more detail in our book, each of these trends
38 See FIDLER, supra note 34, at 65-70 (analyzing the IHR's flaws).
3' Fifty-Eighth World Health Assembly, Revision of the International Health Regulations,
WHA58.3 (May 23, 2005).
40 See David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Secu-
rity: The New International Health Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L LAW 325 (2005); see also
David P. Fidler & Lawrence 0. Gostin, The New International Health Regulations: An His-
toric Development for International Law and Public Health, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 85
(2006).
41 Kenneth D. Ward, The BWC Protocol: Mandate for Failure, 11 THE
NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 183, 183 (2004); see also Press Release, U.S. Mission to Ge-
neva, Statement of the Honorable John R. Bolton Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security, United States Department of State to the Fifth Review Conference
of the Biological Weapons Convention (2001), available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/
press2001/191 lbolton.htm (stating the reasons the Bush Administration rejected the draft
protocol).
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is marked by the forces of globalization and calls for policy responses that
address the truly global nature of the new world of biological weapons gov-
ernance.
Resistance to globalized forms of governance in the biosecurity
realm arises from outmoded notions of how sovereignty relates to security
and public health. Although often criticized, sovereignty remains an influen-
tial idea in international relations. Assertions of sovereignty, of course, are
not always detrimental to biosecurity, such as when a state imposes scien-
tifically-based health regulations that are more stringent than internationally
recognized standards. When used to preserve a poorly regulated status quo,
however, assertions of sovereignty can severely harm national and global
interests in biosecurity.
First, state power to control internal affairs enables political leaders
to set low standards for public health surveillance and regulation. Given the
cross-boundary effects of health threats, a state's failure to identify and re-
spond promptly to domestic health threats poses substantial risks to both its
own citizens and the populations of other nations. Second, the state's con-
trol over borders allows governments to ignore international health stan-
dards in regulating the flow of goods and people across their borders and in
managing the health of their domestic populations. Finally, a state's asser-
tion of non-interference in its domestic affairs provides an ostensible justifi-
cation for failing to cooperate effectively with state and non-state actors and
comply with international health norms. A country may delay notifying the
WHO of an emerging pathogenic threat, prevent its scientists from sharing
information, or refuse to cooperate with international agencies. Each of
these acts of "sovereignty" threatens biosecurity in this global day and
42
age.
There have always been strong reasons for international cooperation
on biological weapons and naturally occurring infectious diseases, but the
need for globalized forms of governance concerning biosecurity goes be-
yond traditional rationale for international cooperation. The relationship
between globalization and the worlds of biological weapons and public
health governance is very different than it was in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries. First, the prominence of security in public health and vice
versa makes today's governance context unique. Calibrating and integrating
national and international governance strategies against biosecurity threats
are challenges for which no precedent exists.
Second, globalization is a more formidable governance challenge
today than it has ever been. Trade and travel (and the technologies that sus-
42 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, World Health Law: Toward a New Conception of Global
Health Governance for the 21st Century, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 413, 417-18
(2005); see also David P. Fidler, SARS: Political Pathology of the First Post- Westphalian
Pathogen, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHics 485, 486-88 (2003).
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tain them) remain vectors of infectious disease spread, just as they were
during the course of the past two hundred years. However, the geographical
reach of these vectors, and the speeds and volumes at which they move
about the planet today, are historically unprecedented. Advances in trans-
portation and other types of technologies have transformed the historical
relationship between public health, science, and globalization into some-
thing simultaneously astonishing and frightening.
Third, the accelerated nature of globalization's impact on public
health and security has not been matched by transformations in public
health and security governance at the national and international levels. Not-
withstanding the radical nature of the IHR 2005, public health governance
at the national and international levels remains weak and fragmented. States
have routinely failed to invest in public health systems, update public health
laws, or stimulate innovative public health research. States' public health
systems are also highly uneven in quality, even though pathogens readily
traverse borders and pose the same epidemiological threat to human health.
States have not recognized the single most important idea in public health-
that the health and safety of their citizens depend on the capacities of all
countries to conduct efficient surveillance and response for infectious dis-
ease. The biosecurity challenge requires rethinking national and interna-
tional governance because of the profound effect contemporary globaliza-
tion has on the security, health, and well-being of populations in every re-
gion.
2. From Power Politics to Global Justice: The Particularly Difficult
Task of Equitable Distribution of Authority and Resources
The global biosecurity threat raises a second overarching question:
What would be the fairest and most cost-effective method of governance
and resource allocation to ensure biosecurity in a globalized world? For
most of modern history, governance and resource allocation has been
largely determined through entrenched power structures. Economically and
politically powerful countries, principally in Europe and North America,
have had a disproportionate influence on the global security and health
agendas. This geopolitical imbalance has caused multiple problems for the
world politics affecting biosecurity.
First, geopolitical centers of power have acted as if it were possible
to protect themselves from the endemic diseases of the developing world.
The international sanitary conventions adopted mainly by 19th century
European countries were an attempt to protect the Western European fron-
tier from the importation of cholera, yellow fever, and plague from Africa
and Asia. Border and immigration policies designed to fend off diseases,
such as hemorrhagic fever, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS, may reflect similar
motivations.
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Second, the developed world has an abiding interest in continuing
its economic vitality through free trade and investment policies and agree-
ments. The importance of commerce is reflected in the IHR 2005's sensitiv-
ity to trade concerns as well as health. 43 Yet, the SARS outbreaks demon-
strated the need for decisive public health action, sometimes directly at the
expense of commerce and trade.44 Economic interests of powerful countries
and multinational companies can, thus, complicate the context in which
public health must act to prevent and promote population health.
Third, developed countries have resisted systematic action to pro-
vide technical and financial assistance for adequate health protection in
poorer countries. To be sure, developed countries have historically provided
development assistance for health purposes; and recently the amount of
financial resources being devoted to global health has increased tremen-
dously.45 But the neglect and complacency of previous decades cannot be
transcended overnight. This failure to allocate resources equitably has pow-
erful ramifications for the future prospects of achieving better global biose-
curity.
Transforming governance and shifting resource allocations from the
model of power politics to one more akin to global justice would have re-
markably positive effects on global biosecurity. Skepticism arises, of
course, through questions that ask why powerful countries should change
their ways significantly in the areas of concern for biosecurity policy. One
could observe that the biosecurity threats present in our globalized world
actually make self-help the most attractive and effective strategy for power-
ful states. And, indeed, governments in North America and Europe have
spared themselves from the same disease-related devastation that has envel-
oped poor regions in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America be-
cause they invested in national public health capabilities for their own popu-
lations.
It might be comforting to continue the policy of erecting a meta-
phorical wall between the developed and developing world-strong national
public health capacities, niggardly international aid, and restrictive policies
on immigrants, refugees, and travelers. Yet, ultimately this game of "beggar
thy neighbor" politics will backfire. The determinations by national security
43 The purpose of the IHR 2005 is "to prevent, protect against, control and provide a pub-
lic health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with
and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with interna-
tional traffic and trade." Int'l Health Regulations, supra note 37, art. 2.
44 See, e.g., Jong-Wha Lee & Warwick J. McKibbin, Globalization and Disease: The Case
of SARS, 3 ASIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS 113, 123-30 (2004); Wayne Kondro, Canadians Still
Stung by WHO's SARS Travel Advisory, 361 LANCET 1624 (2003).
45 See generally Jon Cohen, The New World of Global Health, 311 Sci. 162 (2006) (dis-
cussing amounts of assistance developing countries have devoted to global health).
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policy makers in the United States and in other developed countries that
H1V/AIDS in the developing world and the spread of avian influenza are
security threats underscores this point. Naturally occurring disease threats
are too ubiquitous, terrorists are too dangerous, and globalization too pow-
erful to prevent the spread of biosecurity threats to the northern and western
regions of the globe. The lessons of history all warn against cordon sani-
taire policies that assume the feasibility of erecting walls to keep biosecu-
rity threats out of one's own territory.
One need only recall the great influenza pandemic of 1918, which
caused tens of millions of deaths in a world less than one-third the size of
the current global population. Modem epidemiologists now estimate that
over fifty million people died. If this estimate of the death toll is true, the
virus may have killed as many as eight to ten percent of all young adults
then living.4 Lest we think that this could not happen again, it is well to
remember that highly pathogenic influenza pandemics have occurred
roughly two to three times per century, and that three prerequisites for a
pandemic have emerged as the H5N 1 has spread in Asia and beyond: (1) the
identification of a novel viral subtype in animal populations; (2) viral repli-
cation causing disease and death in humans; and (3) some indications of
sporadic human-to-human transmission.47
There are good reasons, then, based on pure utility to transform
governance mechanisms and re-allocate some resources more evenly across
regions, irrespective of political and economic power. By allowing a larger
group to participate in governance, countries can become more accountable
and also move the agenda to the major disease threats around the globe. At
the same time, by distributing resources more equitably, it will be possible
to detect, prevent, and respond to disease threats more rapidly and effec-
tively.
It would be naive to believe that powerful countries will buy into
policies of large redistribution. Particularly in a health emergency, countries
with manufacturing capacities and political/economic clout will be unlikely
to give up some of their precious stockpiles of vaccines and medications for
the sake of poorer countries.48 The commitment to provide technical and
46 Jeffery K. Taubenberger & David M. Morens, 1918 Influenza: The Mother ofAll Pan-
demics, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15, 15, 19 (2006); Lone Simonsen et al., Pan-
demic Influenza and Mortality: Past Evidence and Projections for the Future, in THE
THREAT OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: ARE WE READY? (Stacey Knobler et al. eds., 2005);
Homeland Security, "Pandemic Influenza," http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hsc-
scen-3_pandemic-influenza.htm.
47 See generally Laurie Garrett, The Next Pandemic?, FOREIGN AFF. 3, July/Aug. (2005),
at 3-23.
48 It is quite likely that in the face of a new pandemic, governments will not export any of
their nationally produced vaccines until domestic demand is satisfied. See David S. Fedson &
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financial assistance for health system improvement in developing countries
need not be open-ended; nor would it necessarily be sufficient to meaning-
fully reduce global health disparities. However, at a minimum, the devel-
oped world should help assure that all nations have core public heath ca-
pacities for surveillance and containment of emerging health threats of
global importance. This kind of commitment not only allows progressive
development of higher standards of health in resource-poor countries, but is
also in the interests of the industrialized world.
IV. BIOSECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW
A. Why the Rule of Law?
The fourth major theme emerging from our analysis of the biosecu-
rity policy revolution concerns the importance of embedding biosecurity in
the rule of law. We find the rule of law salient for debates about biosecurity
policy for four basic reasons. First, the rule of law is essentially a philoso-
phy of governance that is particularly important to consider in an area that is
undergoing unprecedented governance changes. Second, biosecurity in-
volves security considerations, and friction between the exigencies of secu-
rity and the rule of law has existed in the United States and many countries
for much of their respective histories. This friction accompanies the devel-
opment of biosecurity.
Third, many rule of law controversies have already arisen in the
biosecurity context. Some of the most heated political discussions about
biosecurity policy concern whether legal rules should restrain the discretion
of public officials. To what extent should government be permitted to con-
duct intensive surveillance, regulate scientific pursuits, detain subjects for
extended periods without charge, use extreme interrogation measures, or
order compulsory vaccinations or quarantines? These activities, and other
possible examples of controversial measures, are not intended as gratuitous
deprivations of individual rights, or worse, a subterfuge for discrimination.
Rather, most government officials who implement such measures genuinely
believe their actions are needed to protect the public.
Fourth, the normative aspects of the rule of law philosophy of gov-
ernance are important for biosecurity because they force us to ask what kind
of biosecurity we want. The rule of law contains various notions of justice
that connect to conceptions of what constitutes the good society. Taking the
rule of law into account ensures that we think about what kind of biosecu-
rity we want to develop and maintain.
Sergy Haut Pandemic Influenza and the Global Vaccine Supply, 36 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1552, 1555 (2003).
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This section offers a justification for embedding biosecurity in the
rule of law based primarily on normative reasoning. We explain the benefits
to individuals in having a sphere of autonomy, privacy, and liberty even in
an environment of heightened biosecurity concerns. We also explain the
benefits of clear rules and fair processes to a democracy confronted by bio-
security threats. The intent of bioterrorism is to destabilize society, spread
fear, and provoke political over-reaction. The war metaphor often used in
anti-terrorism discourse conveys the importance of fighting for a certain
way of life that prizes personal and political freedom. If the reaction to ter-
rorism diminishes personal liberty, then individuals and society suffer the
very harms that terrorism is intended to inflict.
We understand hard tradeoffs between collective security and indi-
vidual rights must be made. Sometimes people must forego some autonomy,
privacy, or liberty for the common good. Yet, we do not accept that the rule
of law inevitably makes society less safe. No philosophy of governance that
produced insecure societies would be worth embracing and replicating
elsewhere. We demonstrate why the rule of law can actually make society
safer by building into public policy standards for planning, response, and
accountability. It also gives members of the political community a stake in
the society in which they live. By instilling trust in government, the rule of
law facilitates public cooperation. Voluntary action, as opposed to govern-
ment coercion, can be a powerful force for good in a public health emer-
gency.
Biosecurity under the rule of law has instrumental, as well as nor-
mative, value. We explain and justify this position, but before analyzing the
normative and instrumental benefits, we explain what we mean by biosecu-
rity under the rule of law.
B. Understanding the Rule of Law
The rule of law is a complex ideal, without a consistent usage in ju-
risprudence or public discourse. It is a fluid idea, frequently invoked on
both sides of any important political debate.49 The rule of law traditionally
refers to the supremacy of legal rules-the rule of law, not men. Our thesis
is that formal law (not unaccountable exercises of political power) should,
to the extent possible, guide biosecurity policy. At the national level, this
happens by relying upon constitutions, statutes, regulations, and court cases
to authorize the exercise of power and restrain that power. At the transna-
tional level, the rule of law is more complex and involves governance re-
gimes that shape the behavior of actors (e.g., states, corporations, individu-
49 See RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA xii, xii-xiii (2001) (explaining
how both sides used the rule of law in arguing whether President Clinton should be im-
peached).
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als) in ways that promote biosecurity while respecting important values
(e.g., human rights, trade, scientific integrity).
The idea of restraint is at the core of a rule of law system, which
stresses the importance of limits on government power. The fear is that gov-
ernment officials cannot be trusted to place the greater good before their
own personal or political interests. "The essence of government is power,"
wrote James Madison, and "power, lodged as it must be in human hands,
will ever be liable to abuse." 50 Legal rules authorize, and limit, power and
enshrine a sphere of individual freedom. Government officials are restrained
by these rules, forced to adhere to specific standards and procedures, even if
doing so negatively impacts their agenda as they perceive it. This restrain-
ing force prevents government officials from engaging in unjustified, or
even insidious, infringement upon individual liberties.
Restraint of government action is a key aspect of biosecurity under
the rule of law. Restraint comes from the creation of clearly articulated,
previously announced legal standards to guide decision-making, thus assur-
ing that government actors cannot overstep their legally circumscribed au-
thority. Restraint similarly comes from the insistence on rigorous processes
in advance of a coercive action. Clear standards for action and fair proce-
dures are at the heart of the rule of law. When constrained by standards and
process, government action will be more predictable, even-handed, and con-
sistent, thus avoiding the potential for abuse inherent in unfettered power.
Rational rules and procedural systems help prevent arbitrary or invidious
government action in the midst of a crisis. Similarly, individuals and groups
cannot be singled out for adverse treatment if biosecurity policy contains
rules that are racially, ethnically, and socio-economically neutral, both as
written and as applied.
A rule of law system, to be sure, will not prevent all abuses of
power. Nor will it necessarily protect individual rights in all circumstances.
Much depends on the form and content of the law. It may have objective
standards, but does the rule adopt a sufficiently rigorous standard of scien-
tific risk assessment? It may purport to be race or class neutral, but does it
truly treat everyone fairly irrespective of his or her social and economic
vulnerabilities? It may provide fair procedures, but are judicial reviews of
executive actions impartial and prompt? These, and many other questions,
are critical to the effectiveness and fairness of rule of law systems.
Although the traditional idea of rules as a constraining force is im-
portant, we also approach the objective of biosecurity under the rule of law
from a slightly different perspective. Restricting government action is vital,
but not only because of fear that the individuals wielding it will abuse
power. Rather, the rule of law advances normative values that are deeply
50 JAMES MADISON, 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 51 (1884).
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rooted in democratic governance: protection of individual rights and liber-
ties, the pursuit of individual and social justice, and transparent and ac-
countable government.
C. Protection of Individual Rights and Liberties
Among a government's primary obligations are to assure a certain
level of health and security for the population. Absent health and security,
individuals cannot enjoy political, social, and other forms of freedom that
are so important to personal wellbeing and thriving societies. Yet, govern-
ment should also assure a sphere of freedom that requires structural re-
straints on political power, designed to safeguard individual rights and per-
sonal dignity. For nations sharing the central values of the rule of law, safe-
guards of individual rights should bound government action.
Individual rights, of course, need not be absolute. Personal interests
in privacy, bodily integrity, and liberty must sometimes be sacrificed for the
greater good. Even the most cursory examination of traditional public health
powers reveals the burdens achieving population health can place on indi-
viduals. Surveillance, such as reporting and monitoring health records, en-
tails government acquisition, storage, and use of sensitive information, im-
plicating privacy.5' Compulsory vaccination, physical examination and
treatment invade bodily integrity by forcing people to submit to medical
intervention.52 Isolation and quarantine affect the right to free association
and liberty itself.53 Individuals and groups who are singled out by the gov-
ernment express legitimate concerns about stigma, embarrassment, and dis-
crimination.54
Public health powers, of course, also burden economic interests. Li-
censing affects professional freedoms; inspections affect free enterprise; and
nuisance abatements affect the freedom of contract and right to use private
property. Biosecurity policies, in particular, may adversely affect economic
interests including those of vaccine and pharmaceutical manufacturers and
health care institutions. Consider the economic effects of decisions to cull
significant numbers of animals to contain the spread of diseases such as
51 LAWRENCE 0. GosTrIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 115 (2000);
Ronald Bayer & Amy Fairchild, The Limits of Privacy: Surveillance and the Control of
Disease, 10 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 19 (2002).
52 GOSTIN, supra note 51, at 180, 188; Lawrence 0. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at
100 Years: Police Power and Civil Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 577
(2005); Brendon Kohrs, Bioterrorism Defense: Are State Mandated Compulsory Vaccination
Programs an Infringement Upon a Citizen's Constitutional Rights?, 17 J. L. & HEALTH 241
(2002).
53 GoSTIN, supra note 51, at 203; Nola M. Ries, Public Health Law and Ethics: Lessons
from SARS and Quarantine, 13 HEALTH L. REv. 3, 4-5 (2004).
54 GOSTIN, supra note 51, at 76.
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such as avian influenza, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, and foot and
mouth disease.55 Or consider the significant adverse effects of travel adviso-
ries on trade and tourism during the SARS outbreaks.56 International trade
rules may allow diminution of economic interests in a public health emer-
gency, such as compulsory licensing of anti-retrovirals for HIV/AIDS or
Tamiflu for highly pathogenic influenza.
57
While ensuring communal health necessarily entails some sacrifice
of individual liberties, there are reasons for deep concern about government
over-reaction in a public health emergency, especially one associated with
security implications. Governments, understandably, view security of the
population as their highest calling, particularly when the source of harm is
foreign and the acts are aggressive. Terrorist acts by their nature are brutal
and disturbing, often occurring without advance warning. Researchers in-
form us that highly visible, unusual, and violent acts engender the greatest
public fear.58 Government, then, is likely to act boldly, and perhaps repres-
sively, in the face of a terrorist threat, trampling the liberties that they pur-
port to defend.
In response to the terrorist threat, the U.S. federal government has
engaged in a number of actions that many believe represent over-reactions
and infringements on the rule of law. These actions include the USA
PATRIOT Act, the detention of illegal enemy combatants in the United
States and at Guantanamo Bay, and conducting domestic surveillance
within the United States without federal court authorization as required by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Much the same concerns arise with respect to government responses
to naturally occurring diseases and disasters, particularly those that are un-
usual or frightening. Psychological research shows that people have a ten-
dency to overestimate their individual risk when faced with an unfamiliar or
dramatic threat, such as a frightening infectious disease or a catastrophic
natural disaster.59 Governments, in an attempt to protect their populations,
55 See generally World Bank, Sub-Comm. On Global Program for Avian Influences and
Human Pandemic: Economic Impact of Avian Flu (2005), available at http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTE
APREGTOPHEANUT/0,contentMDK:20713527-pagePK:34004173-piPK:34003707-theSi
tePK:503048,OO.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
56 THE WORLD BANK, EAST ASIA UPDATE: COUNTERING GLOBAL SHOCKS 13 (2005), avail-
able at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPHALFYEARLYUPDATE/Resources/EA
P-Brief-final.pdf.
57 See, e.g., David Fidler, The Continuing Global Spread ofAvian Influenza A (H5N1) and
Its Implications for International Law, American Society of International Law, Nov. 7, 2005,
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/l l/insights051107.html.
58 See generally Howard Kunreuther, Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an Uncertain
World, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 655 (2002) (examining different events and the public's concerns).
59 See id at 657-59.
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may overreact with unnecessarily repressive or discriminatory measures.
During the SARS outbreaks, for example, mass quarantine was initiated in
parts of Asia and North America.6° Similarly, in response to the threat of
pandemic influenza, President Bush said he would use the military to en-
force quarantines, 61 a statement from which his administration later back-
tracked because of its legal and policy implications.
The rule of law, through its use of objective standards, requires
government officials to justify infringements of individual rights and liber-
ties. An infringement on individual rights might be unjustified for three
reasons. First, the threat might not rise to a level of severity or probability of
occurrence sufficient to implicate the use of coercive measures (threshold
justification). Second, the proposed intervention might be ineffective
against the threat (efficacy justification). Finally, even if effective, the inter-
vention could be unnecessarily restrictive or intrusive (least restrictive op-
tion analysis). We will deal with each of these issues in turn, demonstrating
how the rule of law, through its use of objective standards, can help prevent
unjustified restrictions on individual rights and liberties.
Biosecurity under the rule of law should deal with the threshold jus-
tification problem by only authorizing action in the face of a demonstrable
risk, as measured by an objective standard. Emergency health legislation
can, for example, be used to authorize the use of broad coercive powers.
However, the legislation can be structured so that these powers are not acti-
vated unless the risk meets a certain, predefined level of certainty and seri-
ousness. Evidence of an existing danger to the community that is both prob-
able and severe is an essential prerequisite to coercive action. In this way,
the rule of law can serve as a justificatory hurdle, restraining coercive gov-
ernment actions until the biosecurity risk warrants their use.
For example, the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(Model Act), drafted by the Center for Law and the Public's Health, re-
quires that a governor declare a "public health emergency" 62 before being
granted special, more robust, powers, such as compulsory medical examina-
tion, vaccination, treatment, quarantine. The governor must satisfy three
60 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
SARS 23-25 (2003), available at http://www.louisville.edu/medschool/ibhpI/images/pdf/SA
RS%20REPORT.pdf (report presented to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).
61 Deidre Walsh, Bush: Military May Have to Help If Bird Flu Breaks Out, CNN.cOM,
Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/04/bush.avianflu/.
62 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT, art. IV (Draft Prepared by the Center
For Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities for the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2001), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHP
A/MSEHPA2.pdf [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. For an overview of the Model Act, see Law-
rence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for and
Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 JAMA 622
(2002).
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demanding conditions before declaring a public health emergency: "(1) an
occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition, that (2) is
caused by bioterrorism or a new or reemerging infectious agent or biologi-
cal toxin previously controlled and that (3) also poses a high probability of a
large number of deaths, a large number of serious or long-term disabilities,
or widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses a signifi-
cant risk of substantial harm to a large number of persons. 63
Furthermore, the Model Act requires that the governor specify
minimum information in the emergency declaration, in support of the exis-
tence of these conditions.64 As a check against arbitrary action, the legisla-
ture may vote to discontinue a declared emergency. 65 Similarly, the courts
can review whether the governor has demonstrated the existence of the con-
ditions listed above.6 6 The Model Act was specifically designed to give
states the robust powers necessary for confronting a public health emer-
gency, but the legislation was designed to only allow those potentially coer-
cive powers when absolutely necessary. A governor's power is limited by
the extent to which he or she can demonstrate the existence of a real threat.
Assuming the "risk" threshold has been adequately met, the next is-
sue involves justifying the particular intervention. Biosecurity under the rule
of law requires an assessment of the likely efficacy of the intervention.
Government officials must show that the technique they wish to use will
actually diminish the risk or ameliorate the harm. Abrogation of individual
rights and liberties can only be justified if the intervention is necessary and
effective to achieve an important objective. Furthermore, governments must
use the least restrictive intervention necessary to reduce the risk or amelio-
rate the harm. Usually, multiple effective strategies will be available, vary-
ing in their liberty-restricting coerciveness. The law should require govern-
ment officials to select the most effective option that imposes the least re-
striction on individual rights.
The law can incorporate the principles of the most effective and
least restrictive interventions necessary to abate the risk. Under the Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act, isolation and quarantine may only be
used pursuant to a court order based on evidence that the intervention will
prevent transmission of an infectious disease, is necessary to protect the
community's health, and no other less restrictive option is available.67 The
court order must be obtained before acting, except in urgent situations. Even
63 Gostin et al., supra note 62, at 625.
64 MODEL ACT, art. IV, §§ 401-02.
65 Id. § 405.
66 Id.
67 Id. art. VI, §§ 604-05.
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when immediate action is required, a court order must be obtained as
quickly as possible.68
The Model Act similarly requires strong procedural due process
protections. Individuals subject to restrictive action must receive written
copies of the court order, accompanied by an explanation of their rights.
69
They have a right to a hearing during which they can challenge the order's
validity, or the specific terms contained therein.7°
By requiring justificatory evidence at every step, the rule of law en-
sures that government will have the power to protect the community's
health, but that this power is used only where necessary to reduce a serious
health threat. With clearly articulated, objectively based legal standards and
fair processes, the rule of law helps ensure that government will not unjusti-
fiably infringe individual rights and liberties.
D. The Importance of Justice: Non-Discrimination, Natural Justice,
and Distributive Justice
Justice is a complex and subtle concept with multiple meanings, but
we focus on three that have special relevance to biosecurity policy: (1) non-
discrimination-treating people equitably based on their individual charac-
teristics (respect for difference); natural justice-affording individuals pro-
cedural fairness when imposing a burden or withholding a benefit (due
process); and distributive justice-fair disbursement of common advantages
and sharing of common burdens (fair allocation of risks, burdens, and bene-
fits). For each of these meanings of justice, we explain how the rule of law
advances their integration into biosecurity policy.
1. Justice as Fair Treatment: The Principle of Non-Discrimination
Just as political philosophers have focused on protection of individ-
ual interests, they have also stressed the responsibility of governments to
treat individuals fairly. Justice requires "fair, equitable, and appropriate
treatment in light of what is due or owed" to individuals and groups. 7' Jus-
tice does not require universally equal treatment, but does require that simi-
larly situated people be treated equally. Aristotle expressed the ideal of jus-
tice as the equal treatment of equals and the unequal treatment of un-
equals.72
6 Id. § 605.
69 Id.
70 MODEL ACT, art. VI, § 605.
71 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 327
(1994).
72 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK V (H. Rackham trans., rev. ed. 1990).
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Perhaps the most important aspect of justice as fair treatment is en-
capsulated in the principle of non-discrimination. The principle is more sub-
tle than it may at first glance appear. At the simplest level, non-
discrimination is the unfair treatment of a person because of his or her
membership in a socially distinct group or category, such as race, ethnicity,
sex, religion, age, or disability. Non-discrimination, therefore, requires that
people be treated according to their individual characteristics and not their
membership or association with a group. It cautions against judgments
based on prejudice, irrational fear, or stereotype. Consequently, non-
discrimination seeks equality of treatment among those who are similarly
situated. For example, if a coercive action is needed to avert a risk, it should
be fairly distributed among those who pose a real risk of transmitting infec-
tion.
Justice as fair treatment of individuals and groups is of particular
concern in biosecurity policy because the histories of national security and
public health have constant reminders of the unfair treatment of individuals
and groups. One of the darkest marks in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is
the Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu v. United States (1944), in
which the Court let stand, under the banner of national security, a blatantly
racist detention program that stigmatized Japanese-Americans.73 Disease
epidemics, through a combination of fear and preexisting prejudices, have
had a way of bringing out the worst in people. Societies have tended to
blame outsiders for traumatic health events, often vilifying them in the
process. It is difficult to exaggerate the dread caused by disease epidemics
and the destabilizing effects on people and their communities. Persons suf-
fering from, or exposed to, disease may be viewed as public menaces, or
worse, loathed and blamed for their own condition.
Compulsory public health measures have been applied in ways that
are better explained by discriminatory animus than by scientific reason.
Several campaigns of restraint in 19th and 20th century America demon-
strate the influence of prejudice: isolation of persons with yellow fever,
despite its mode of transmission by mosquitoes; 74 arrests of alcoholics, es-
pecially poor Irishmen, in the false belief that cholera arose from intemper-
73 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
74 David Musto, Quarantine and the Problem of AIDS, 64 MILBANK Q. 97, 102 (1986).
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ance; 75 mass confinement of prostitutes suspected of having syphilis; 76 and
forced removal of children thought to have poliomyelitis. 77
In one case, a federal court found that public health authorities were
acting "with an evil eye and an unequal hand" by visiting a quarantine al-
most exclusively on Chinese Americans in a district of San Francisco.78
Even in contemporary times, the hand of discrimination has been at work in,
for example, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, particularly in policies targeting
vulnerable groups such as injection drug users, sex workers, and gay men.79
During the SARS outbreaks, hurtful stereotypes were rampant in the West
about persons of Asian descent, implying they were unhygienic and vectors
of infection. 80 This unfortunate trend continues, even in our supposedly
more enlightened times.
Beyond the problem of overt prejudice and discrimination is the
problem of neglect of the vulnerable. In the aftermath of the anthrax attacks
in Washington, D.C. in October 2001, the government lavished great atten-
tion on Senate staffers while virtually ignoring postal workers. 81 And the
images of poor, mostly African American survivors of Hurricane Katrina in
2005 were seared onto the memory of television audiences throughout the
world. Natural disasters are color-blind, and the relief efforts were not de-
signed to be discriminatory. Yet government knows, or ought to know, that
it is the poor who are congregated together in substandard conditions, that
they cannot afford to evacuate, and that they would be most vulnerable to
harm in a public health emergency. Hurricane Katrina taught this deeply
important and unfortunate lesson about the profound harm that results from
discrimination caused by a complacent eye and neglectful hand.
The rule of law can be a tool to protect against discrimination in
biosecurity crises. Non-discrimination can be accomplished principally
through the use of neutral rules, fairly enforced, and based on objective sci-
75 Guenter B. Risse, Epidemics and History: Ecological Perspectives and Social Re-
sponses, in AIDS: THE BURDENS OF HISTORY 33, 45-46 (Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M. Fox
eds., 1988).
76 ALLAN M. BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN
THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 (1985).
77 Guenter B. Risse, Revolt Against Quarantine: Community Responses to the 1916 Polio
Epidemic, Oyster Bay, New York, 14 TRANSACTIONS AND STUDIES OF THE COLLEGE OF
PHYSICIANS OF PHILADELPHIA 23 (1992).
78 Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 24 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
79 See generally LAWRENCE 0. GOST1N, THE AIDS PANDEMIC: COMPLACENCY, INJUSTICE,
AND UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS (2004).
80 Iris Chang, Op-Ed., Fear of SARS, Fear of Strangers, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2003, at
A3 1.
81 See Eric Lipton & Kirk Johnson, Tracking Bioterror's Tangled Course, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2001, at B5.
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entific evidence. 82 In contrast, discrimination is based on irrational, non-
scientific biases. The biosecurity context manifests this discrimination as
the unreasonable conflation of racial, cultural, and socioeconomic attributes
with the etiology of disease. 83 It is harder to draw social or racial distinc-
tions when the law requires action based on objective standards based on
scientific risk assessments. Beyond neutral standards, the law can explicitly
create sanctions for actions based on race, disability, or socioeconomic
status. If non-discrimination statutes are well drafted and vigorously en-
forced, they can demonstrate a commitment to fair treatment of the poor and
minorities, which can be particularly important in times of a health crisis.
2. Natural Justice: Procedural Due Process
Fair processes are critically important to sound, balanced decision-
making under the rule of law. Procedural fairness is so fundamental to ide-
als of justice that Europeans frame it as "natural justice," while North
Americans frame it as "due process." The conduct of legal proceedings ac-
cording to established rules ensures the fundamental fairness that lies at the
heart of due process. The elements of due process include notice, trial rights
including representation by an attorney, and a fair hearing before a neutral
tribunal with the power to decide the case.
The normative value of due process is well grounded in constitu-
tional and human rights law. For example, Article 9 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the right to liberty and
security of person and freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention: "No one
shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law. ... Anyone who is deprived
of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings be-
fore a court, in order that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness
of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.,
84
These words have meaning and importance in the context of biose-
curity policy. Governments can go a long way toward ensuring natural jus-
tice by subjecting their national security and public health decisions to rig-
orous independent review by a court or tribunal. Natural justice requires
government to afford individuals a fair hearing in conjunction with the ex-
82 Procedural due process protections are also important, but will be discussed in the sub-
sequent section. See infra Part IV.D.2.
83 See David P. Eisenman et al., Will Public Health's Response to Terrorism be Fair?
Racial/Ethnic Variations in Perceived Fairness During a Bioterrorist Event, 2 BIOSECURITY
AND BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE, AND SCIENCE 146 (2004) (discussing
the importance of perceived fairness to the effectiveness of the public health departments'
response during catastrophic bioterrorism).
84 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 9, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966).
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ercise of compulsory powers. Due process should be afforded before the
individual is deprived of his rights, but could occur soon thereafter in an
emergency.
The new worlds of biological weapons and public health govern-
ance will, in all likelihood, involve governments taking compulsory meas-
ures against individuals and thus infringing on their rights. Government
powers exercised with respect to the criminalization of biological weapons
development and use, regulation of the biological sciences, conduct of bio-
defense activities, and responses to biological attacks or infectious disease
outbreaks may well be coercive with respect to individuals, creating the
need for procedural due process.
Fair processes protect a sphere of liberty by enabling people to con-
test potentially arbitrary, excessive, or wrongful biosecurity interventions.
An orderly, systematic process can also promote more informed decision-
making, which better serves the public interest. Due process is an important
means of forestalling or correcting errors and allowing individuals to be
made whole in instances of abuse. Perhaps most importantly, fair processes
are inherently preferable as they affirm human dignity. Individuals gain a
sense of respect for themselves and the legal system when they have a
meaningful opportunity to present their case in an open forum. Fair proc-
esses facilitate public trust,8 5 which is essential for orderly and safe behavior
in a biosecurity emergency.
3. Distributive Justice: Racial and Economic Fairness
The final aspect of justice that is important in biosecurity policy is
distributive justice, which we have already discussed in connection with the
need for globalized biosecurity governance.86 This form of justice requires
that the risks, benefits, and burdens of biosecurity actions be fairly distrib-
uted, thus precluding the unjustified targeting of already socially vulnerable
populations. Distributive justice is the fair distribution of benefits and bur-
dens in a cooperative society.87
In the context of public health, the principle requires that officials
act to limit the extent to which the burden of disease falls unfairly upon the
85 PRINCIPLES OF THE ETHICAL PRACTICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Public Health Leadership
Society, 2002), available at http://www.apha.org/codeofethics/ethicsbrochure.pdf.
86 See supra Part III.C.2.
87 See generally Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health as Social Justice, in NEW ETHICS FOR
THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 101, 105 (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock eds., 1999) (dis-
cussing an ideal "public health ethic" which includes "organized collective action ... shared
equally" among citizens); James F. Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Ter-
rain, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 170, 176-77 (2002) ("[S]ome evidence suggests that societies
that embody more egalitarian conceptions of socioeconomic justice have higher levels of
health than ones that do not.").
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least advantaged and to ensure that the burden of interventions themselves
are distributed equitably.88 Thus, in the exercise of compulsory powers,
distributive justice requires a fair allocation so as not to unduly burden par-
ticularly vulnerable populations. Distributive justice has been viewed as so
central to the mission of public health that it has been described as its core
value: "[T]he historic dream of public health ... is a dream of social jus-
tice. ,, 9
Distributive justice does not merely require a fair allocation of risks
and burdens. It also recognizes that public health often distributes benefits
such as vaccines, treatment, disease protection devices (e.g., mosquito bed
nets), access to health information, or other products or services. Problems
of fair benefits allocation arise under conditions of scarcity, where there is a
competition for resources. Such competition might occur, for example, with
a scarcity of vaccines or treatment in the midst of a public health crisis, such
as pandemic influenza. Therapeutic services can confer considerable benefit
to the individual and ultimately to a population. Pandemic influenza would
likely result in a paucity of vaccines and antiviral medications, raising the
hard problem of fair allocation of scarce resources, nationally and interna-
tionally.90
Advancing distributive justice is not an easy task because it forces
decisions about rationing scarce resources. What values should guide ration-
ing decisions: private need (treatment of the sick); public need (prevention
among vulnerable populations); maintenance of essential services (protec-
tion of health care workers and "first responders"); or political influence
(priority for those with political power and connections)? As indicated ear-
lier, the de facto allocation principle in world politics has been political
power.
The concept of distributive justice requires that public health inter-
ventions be undertaken in order to benefit the most people possible, regard-
less of their power or influence. This requirement drives policy to use pri-
vate and public need to guide decisions involving resource allocations. Pri-
vate need elevates the importance of increasing the resources utilized for
88 See generally Susan Hurley, The 'What' and the 'How' of Distributive Justice and
Health, in EGALITARIANISM. NEW ESSAYS ON THE NATURE AND VALUE OF EQUALITY (Nils
Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, eds. 2007).
89 Beauchamp, supra note 87, at 105.
90 See Lawrence 0. Gostin & Madison Powers, What Does Justice Require for the Pub-
lic's Health?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1053, 1059 (2006); see generally CmzEN VOICES ON
PANDEMIC FLU CHOICES, PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT PILOT PROJECT ON PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
(2005), available at http://ppc.unl.edu/publications/documents/PEPPPI_FINALREPORT_
DEC_2005.pdf; John D. Arras, Ethical Issues in the Distribution of Influenza Vaccines,
YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. (forthcoming 2006); Kelley Lee & David P. Fidler, Avian and
Pandemic Influenza: Progress and Problems with Global Health Governance, GLOBAL PUB.
HEALTH (forthcoming 2007).
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
countries and populations experiencing the greatest burden of disease. Pub-
lic need would allocate resources where they would do the most good for
global health. This objective might mean rapidly allocating resources to a
country experiencing an early outbreak of a novel disease in order to keep
the outbreak from spreading. Public health interventions would, therefore,
be used primarily for prevention and targeted at those who face the greatest
risk of transmission. In other contexts, distributive justice may support pri-
ority allocations to essential workers who maintain public services critical
to the functioning of modem societies.
The rule of law can contribute to this task of just rationing by creat-
ing allocation standards that require decision makers to consider a popula-
tion's ability to cope with burdens and their need for extra access to bene-
fits. This approach can take the form of distributive rules that account for
the reality that certain populations are more vulnerable to disease and ill-
ness.
Of course, this requires that officials treat groups differently, seem-
ingly violating the principle of neutrally written, scientifically based deci-
sion making standards. By incorporating the principle of distributive justice
into biosecurity policy, certain populations will be treated differently from
others. However, this approach is ethically justified because distribution is
based on need and vulnerability.91 Unlike discrimination, which is based on
irrational biases and stereotypes, distributive justice requires policy makers
to face the scientific fact that certain populations require more help, and can
bear fewer burdens, than others. All citizens deserve the protection of an
effective biosecurity policy; it is naive to assume that everyone has the same
level of economic and social resources.
Unless policy makers recognize and internalize the reality that cer-
tain populations are more vulnerable than others because of their economic
status, unjust health consequences will result. This became evident in the
aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, where poor, often minority,
populations did not possess the resources to evacuate. The government re-
sponse plan did not account for this fact, leaving the burden of evacuation
almost solely as the responsibility of individual citizens, with tragic conse-
quences. Even though officials knew about this problem, 92 nothing was
91 For example, American society has accepted "need" as the singular principle for alloca-
tion of seasonal (interpandemic) influenza vaccine. Consequently, priority is given to the
elderly and health care workers. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HHS
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, app. D at D13-D15 (2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
pandemicflu/plan/appendixd.html; James G. Hodge, Jr. & Jessica P. O'Connell, The Legal
Environment Underlying Influenza Vaccine Allocation and Distribution Strategies, 12 J. PUB.
HEALTH MGMT. PR.AC. 340, 341 (2006).
92 See generally WHO ARE KATRINA'S VICTIMS? (Center for American Progress, 2006),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-5D6
FF2E06E03%7D/KATRINAVICTIMS.PDF (presenting census data indicating that large
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done. In July 2004, FEMA staged an exercise simulating a hurricane disas-
ter scenario in New Orleans. Officials acknowledged that tens of thousands
of residents would not have the means to evacuate with government assis-
tance. Rather than address this concern, they based their response plan on
the assumption that one-third of the city's residents would not be able to
evacuate.93 Had distributive justice been a guiding principle, officials could
have avoided much of the death and illness disproportionately borne by
minority populations.
Social justice demands more than fair distribution of resources in
circumstances of extreme health emergency. The interests of vulnerable
populations are undermined well beyond the detriments to their health. A
failure to act expeditiously and with equal concern for all citizens, including
the poor and less powerful, predictably harms the whole community by
eroding public trust and undermining social cohesion. It signals to those
affected and to everyone else that the basic human needs of some matter
less than those of others, and it thereby fails to show the respect due to all
members of the community. Social justice thus encompasses not only a core
commitment to a fair distribution of resources, but it also calls for policies
of action that are consistent with the preservation of human dignity and the
showing of equal respect for the interests of all members of the commu-
94
nity.
E. Transparent and Accountable Governance
Thus far, we have discussed how biosecurity under the rule of law
protects individual rights and ensures that government acts fairly. The rule
of law has a third normative benefit: the facilitation of open and accountable
government. 95 Open government, or transparency, requires government of-
ficials to make decisions in full public view. The relevant public groups
(e.g., stakeholders and the more generally interested public) should under-
stand the factors that go into making a decision or rule: the facts and evi-
dence, the goals, the steps taken to safeguard individual rights, the reasons
for the decision, and the procedures for appealing. Open governance may be
accomplished in many ways, including open forums with advance notifica-
tion to the public, publication of regulatory proposals in a public register,
and the right of citizens to make verbal and written comments. The hall-
numbers of impoverished and minority persons resided in Louisiana and other states ef-
fected by Hurricane Katrina).
93 See Susan B. Glasser & Michael Grunwald, The Steady Buildup to a City's Chaos:
Confusion ReignedAt Every Level Of Government, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2005, at Al.
94 Gostin & Powers, supra note 90, at 1059.
95 For a systematic discussion, see LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER,
DuTY, RESTRAINT (2d ed. forthcoming 2007).
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marks of open governance, then, are free flows of information and civic
participation.
Accountability refers to the idea that good governance requires
more than appropriate policy; government must be held responsible for exe-
cuting policies fairly and efficiently. Transparent government is accountable
to its citizens. This accountability certainly occurs through a democratic
process as the public considers policies at the ballot box. However, public
accountability goes beyond elections. It comes from checks and balances
among the three branches of government. Thus, security and public health
officials are politically accountable to the chief executive, must act within
the scope of legislative authority, and are subject to judicial oversight. Pub-
lic accountability also comes from having to justify governmental decisions
to the public generally and to affected communities in particular. Finally,
public accountability comes from protection of "whistleblowers"-people
within agencies who speak out about illegal, improper, or secretive conduct.
Since the public cannot know when public officials are concealing impor-
tant information, it is imperative to encourage insiders to reveal matters of
public concern.
96
Openness and accountability are important to biosecurity govern-
ance because of their intrinsic value and capacity to improve decision-
making. Citizens gain a sense of satisfaction by participating in policy mak-
ing and having their voices heard. Even if government decides that individ-
ual interests must yield to common needs, those who participated sense that
their civic importance and personal values have been acknowledged and
taken into account.
Transparency also has instrumental value because it provides a
feedback mechanism-a way of informing public policy and arriving at
more considered judgments. Open forms of governance engender and sus-
tain public trust, which benefits the biosecurity enterprise more generally.
Without public support, and the voluntary cooperation of those at risk, coer-
cive biosecurity interventions would be difficult to achieve. The populace
must be able to trust that its government is acting in its best interests.
When a government takes action to protect or enhance biosecurity,
how can the public know whether that action was appropriate? How can
citizens ensure that the government is acting in their best interests? Biosecu-
rity under the rule of law not only limits government power, but it also af-
fords a means of accountability. The law can identify the powers available
to government, and when those powers can be used (delineation of powers).
96 In Garcetti et al. v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court scaled back protections for govern-
ment workers who blow the whistle on official misconduct. In a victory for the Bush admini-
stration, justices said the twenty million public employees do not have full free speech pro-
tections when making "statements pursuant to ... official duties." Garcetti v. Ceballos, No.
04-473, slip op. at 5, 9 (U.S. May 30, 2006).
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It can require that the use of a power be justified through the imposition of
objective, neutral legal standards that guide decision-making procedures
(substantive justification). Finally, the law can put procedural protections in
place to ensure that any decision is subject to judicial or legislative over-
sight (procedural checks and balances). Each of these rule of law character-
istics provides a means through which a population can hold their govern-
ment accountable in the new world of biosecurity governance.
Delineation of powers serves a defining function. A statute that ar-
ticulates what is, and is not, authorized can be a helpful device. The elector-
ate can use the statute to scrutinize government action. If law does not au-
thorize the action, the government will be exposed as having overstepped its
bounds. Officials will be aware that their constituents could notice any de-
viation from the rule of law. As a result, government officials will have an
incentive to conform to rule of law's pre-articulated delineation of powers,
or risk potential negative political repercussions.
The justification requirement takes accountability one step further.
Even if a power has been authorized, it still must be used only when neces-
sary. Specifically, as we argued above, a power must be used in the least
restrictive way possible, and the benefits/burdens of that action must be
distributed justly. International tribunals have applied the least restrictive
measure necessary principle to actions purported to protect public health.97
In order for a population to ensure that their government is using an author-
ized power appropriately, they need access to the decision-making process.
Why was a specific intervention chosen? What others were discarded? How
is the decision going to be implemented? And most importantly, on what
evidence has the decision been based?
By requiring that governments comply with neutral, objective stan-
dards, the rule of law forces governments to articulate explicitly and pub-
licly the rationale behind their decisions. This dynamic gives the public a
tool by which they can evaluate whether an authorized power has been used
in their best interests. Stated another way, the principle of transparency is a
mechanism by which government can be held accountable for its decision-
making procedures. Transparency is premised on the principle that indi-
viduals should understand the facts and reasons justifying biosecurity inter-
ventions, the goals of intervention, and the steps taken to safeguard individ-
ual rights. Furthermore, because all information and decision making is
97 See, e.g., Enhorn v. Sweden, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005, 30 E.H.R.R. 2005 (finding a viola-
tion of art. 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights because the government had
not sought "less severe measures" before isolating a person living with HIV/AIDS), avail-
able at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2005/Jan/ChamberjudgmentEnhornvSweden2501
05.htm. See also Robyn Martin, The Exercise of Public Health Powers in Cases of Infectious
Disease: Human Rights Implications, 14 MEDICAL L. REv. 132 (2006).
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accessible, it encourages civic deliberation and public participation in the
biosecurity policy making process.
Finally, accountability is meaningless without an effective en-
forcement mechanism. Knowing that the government has acted inappropri-
ately is valueless unless there is a procedure for overturning that decision.
The law can ensure enforcement in multiple ways. It can establish proce-
dural protections that serve as a check on governmental action. Often, these
protections take the form of judicial hearings where individuals can chal-
lenge the justification or implementation of a government action. Similarly,
the law can impose legislative oversight, giving an elected body the power
to overturn executive decisions. Such a structure exists in the Model Act,
where a governor's declaration of a health emergency can be reversed by
the state legislature.98
Despite its undoubted value, transparency may be hard to achieve in
the real world of politics. How do we know when public officials are simply
feigning transparency by making it look as if they are open and fair? The
reasons given for their decisions may simply be "spin," which is becoming
ubiquitous in our democracy. And, although officials may hold open meet-
ings, how do we know they are not unduly influenced by economically
powerful special interests acting behind the scenes, such as large industries
making profits from selling oil, tobacco, firearms, or even pharmaceuticals?
Citizens should not become complacent about transparency, but should in-
sist that officials engaged in all aspects of biosecurity adhere to the literal
meaning of the term-truth and openness.
F. Practical Benefits of Biosecurity under the Rule of Law
We have argued that creating biosecurity policy under the rule of
law is vital because it protects individual rights, promotes justice, and en-
courages open and accountable government. Yet, many would argue that
biosecurity crises are so variable, complex, unpredictable, and time-
sensitive that government needs the freedom to act quickly, using its best
judgment to react to the particular situation at hand. The rule of law, by
definition, restricts government's ability to be responsive to urgent health
threats. Requiring compliance with neutral standards and the presentation of
scientific evidence to justify an action limits the range of actions available
to government and occupies precious time. Even with the normative bene-
fits offered by a rule of law system, perhaps practical issues could make it
prohibitively difficult, undermining the need to strengthen the country's
biosecurity.
Although this argument is not without merit, we believe that it
overstates the practical shortcomings of biosecurity under the rule of law. In
98 MODEL ACT, art. IV, § 405.
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fact, the rule of law can produce a number of consequential benefits that
would make biosecurity policy more effective and efficient. In this section,
we explore these practical benefits, focusing on two areas: preparation for
and response to a biosecurity emergency. Preparation involves the creation
of systems that minimize the risk of an event occurring and that facilitate
the mitigation of harm should an event occur. However, the best laid plans
for an emergency are empty unless they lead to an effective response. Re-
sponse is the set of actions designed to stop, contain, or reduce disease once
an outbreak has occurred.
1. Preparation for a Biosecurity Emergency
Having a systematic plan for preparing for biosecurity emergencies
has been a salient topic of discussion following the Gulf Coast hurricanes
(where relevant federal, state, and local agencies appeared ill-prepared) and
avian and pandemic influenza (where multiple layers of government issued
multiple plans for action that would prove difficult to integrate). Three im-
portant problems relate to sound preparation: resource allocations between
security, biomedicine, and public health; high versus low probability events;
and transnational cooperation.
Allocation of Resources. All societies have limited resources. Cer-
tainly poorer countries have more extreme scarcity, but even well developed
countries have resource limitations when catastrophes strike. Societies face
the hard problem of allocating resources (e.g., vaccines, pharmaceuticals,
hospital beds) in a way that creates the highest level of biosecurity for the
population. One important manifestation of this resource allocation problem
is choosing among security measures, biotechnology, and public health.
Security systems are designed to prevent a biological threat from occurring.
Security might mean increasing law enforcement to find and arrest a poten-
tial terrorist. Biotechnology entails scientific research; stockpiling and de-
livery of vaccines or pharmaceuticals; and access to health care services.
Public health systems have the goal of early detection and response to bio-
logical threats, which entails surveillance and interventions, such as contact
tracing, directly observed therapy, and isolation of the infected.
Each of these needs is important. Security is crucial for preventing
the unauthorized release of dangerous laboratory specimens, detecting plots
to intentionally release infectious agents, and bringing perpetrators to jus-
tice. Biotechnology is essential for ensuring that medical prevention and
treatment is readily available to the population. Adequate vaccination pro-
grams can help prevent outbreaks, while treatment can be ameliorative and
also preventative by reducing infectiousness. Strong public health infra-
structures are similarly important. Having state-of-the-art laboratories, data
systems, and a well trained and well paid public health workforce can allow
for early detection and containment of disease outbreaks.
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Although all three of these variables are fundamental to sound bio-
security policy, many developed countries, and particularly the United
States, have focused far too strongly on the first two aspects, leaving public
health systems in "disarray. '99 In the context of biological weapons, coun-
tries have focused on domestic security and international arms control, at-
tempting to keep any event from occurring. In the United States, for exam-
ple, many core public health functions have been assigned to the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security at the expense of the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention.100 The reality is that no amount of traditionally con-
ceived security efforts can keep disease out of a country, whatever the ori-
gin of the pathogens. Even if the threat of bioterrorism could be completely
eradicated (an unrealistic proposition), the globe must still confront the con-
stant threat of naturally occurring pandemics and natural disasters.
The most well developed countries have also focused heavily on
biotechnology. The Department of Homeland Security's budget has devoted
the vast majority of health-related funds to research, development, and
stockpiling of new vaccines and pharmaceuticals.' 1 Substantial resources,
for example, went into development of better vaccines for smallpox and
influenza in light of recent events. Similarly, resources were devoted to
stockpiling Tamiflu in response to the threat of pandemic influenza. 1
02
There is nothing wrong with these expenditures per se, but such ex-
penditures have been at the expense of the daily needs of public health
agencies for surveillance and response to all threats. Indeed, public health
99 The Institute of Medicine's landmark report on The Future of Public Health in 1988
observed that the governmental public health infrastructure was in "disarray." INST. OF MED.,
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988). The Institute of Medicine's 2003 report stated that
in many ways it was "still in disarray." INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH
IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 98 (2003). Similarly, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention concluded that, despite recent improvements, the public health infrastructure "is
still structurally weak in nearly every area." DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC
HEALTH'S INFRASTRUCTURE: A STATUS REPORT iii (2001) prepared for the Appropriations
Committee of the United States Senate, 2001.
100 Michele Late, Homeland Department Plan May Undermine Public Health: Some HHS
Duties Proposed to Shift, THE NATION'S HEALTH, Aug. 2002, available at http://www.apha.
org/tnh/index.cfm?fa=Adetail&id= 1464.
101 The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005 provides $2.5 bil-
lion for Project Bioshield for the development and pre-purchase of necessary medical coun-
termeasures against weapons of mass destruction, and improved bio-surveillance by expand-
ing air monitoring for biological agents in high-threat cities and high-value targets such as
stadiums and transit systems. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet:
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005, (Oct. 18, 2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pressrelease_0541 .shtm.
102 President George W. Bush requested $1.029 billion to stockpile antiviral medications.
Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Safeguarding America Against Pandemic In-
fluenza (Nov. 1, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/2005
1 101.html.
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agencies have argued that this biotechnology focus on a few health threats
has undermined preparedness for the broad range of threats, particularly
from naturally occurring infectious diseases and disasters103
Unfortunately, the disproportionate focus on security and biotech-
nology has left little room for improving the public health systems designed
to mitigate harm in the inevitable event of a biosecurity emergency. Current
approaches may not, therefore, be achieving the integration of security and
public health so vital to biosecurity in the global age.
This argument meshes with the importance of the rule of law to bio-
security policy. Biosecurity under the rule of law has the practical benefit of
shifting society's emphasis on traditional security thinking by focusing on
the full range of security, medicine, and public health problems. This objec-
tive connects to the rule of law's requirement that governance norms and
rules be prospectively articulated. Prospective biosecurity laws should be
debated, enacted, and implemented in times of relative calm, well before a
crisis occurs.
During this window of rationality, public health advocates can
demonstrate the need for more attention to be focused on strengthening pub-
lic health infrastructure. Granted, this task is difficult given that public
health initiatives are inherently preventive. If they work, disease threats and
prevalence decline, which encourages politicians to believe that the problem
has been solved. As a result, gaining sustained political support for public
health initiatives can be a daunting challenge absent an obvious crisis, like
the frenzy caused by the threat of pandemic influenza. We do not suggest
that biosecurity under the rule of law is a magic bullet that can completely
solve this problem. Rather, the rule of law provides a rational framework,
insulated from emergency situations, that makes it easier to argue for alloca-
tion decisions that integrate security, biotechnology, and public health.
Surveillance of High and Low Probability Events. Once resources
are allocated, the next step is to watch for potential biosecurity risks, so as
to better respond should they emerge. Here, the problem is one of orienta-
tion. Society has a tendency to focus on high consequence, low probability
events. When faced with a tangible, dramatic threat, people want actions
that will most directly and concretely address the threat. This dynamic can
prompt government action, even if the probability of occurrence is low. For
example, preparation for bioterrorist attacks consumes a disproportionate
share of attention and resources, even though they are much less likely to
occur than naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks. A classic illus-
103 See, e.g., Concerning the Public Health Budget for Fiscal Year 2006: Hearing Before
the H. Appropriations Subcommittee on the Departments of Labor, Health, and Human Ser-
vices, Education, and Related Agencies, 109th Cong. 684 (2006) (statement of the American
Public Health Association), available at http://www.apha.org/legislative/testimonies/APHA
AppropriationsTestimony.doc.
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
tration of this problem was the panicked attention given to anthrax and
smallpox after September 11, 2001.
We have argued that an effective biosecurity policy requires an ori-
entation towards both high and low probability events, but with an emphasis
on the most probable situations. An unwavering attention to unlikely bioter-
rorist attacks is irresponsible if it precludes confronting the near certainty of
serious naturally occurring diseases and disasters. The rule of law, if con-
structed with careful risk assessments, has the consequential benefit of help-
ing society achieve an appropriate orientation towards both high and low
probability biosecurity events.
This benefit results from a mechanism similar to the one discussed
in the previous section. Prospectively promulgated rules, insulated from the
stress of an immediate crisis, create a more effective biosecurity policy by
allowing for a focus on policy initiatives that deal with events that are most
probable. By prospectively creating a rational biosecurity plan, isolated
from the political influence of popular fears, society is not limited by a fo-
cus on establishing security systems to prevent the most dramatic (and least
likely) events. The rule of law helps create a rational framework that re-
quires evidence and justification for policy decisions. This approach allows
policy makers to focus on measurable probabilities, rather than unsubstanti-
ated fears.
Facilitating Global Cooperation. Global cooperation and govern-
ance is vital to a being well-prepared for the range of biosecurity risks. Dis-
eases can originate anywhere and can quickly spread in an age of rapid
global transportation and commerce. We have argued that globalized gov-
ernance structures are vital aspects of an effective biosecurity policy. The
rule of law can facilitate the creation and implementation of cooperative
global biosecurity policies.
As we have noted, the only true protection against biological
threats, both naturally occurring and intentionally inflicted, comes through
cooperative arrangements among countries and non-state actors. These ar-
rangements may or may not be legally binding in terms of formal interna-
tional law, but they are designed to provide the kind of rationally crafted
collective action that will facilitate effective responses to biosecurity
threats. The effective global governance utilized to address the SARS out-
breaks in 2003 was not authorized by the IHR 1969 or any other formal
international legal agreement, yet states and non-state actors participated in
a response that changed the paradigm for infectious disease governance for
the twenty-first century.
2. Responding to a Health Emergency
Perhaps the two most important problems associated with respond-
ing to a biosecurity emergency are timely decision-making and coordination
of action. Hurricane Katrina, again, offers a lesson. During the response and
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rescue phase of that natural disaster, it became evident that key questions
were left unanswered: Who is in charge and accountable? How can the
various public services be coordinated (e.g., police, emergency manage-
ment, health care, public health)? What is the respective role of federal,
state, and local agencies? 04 Similar questions have arisen in various table-
top exercises designed to simulate biosecurity crises, such as the use of bio-
logical weapons by terrorists.
Improved Decision-Making. Decision-making poses a problem in
the stressful, time-limited context of a biosecurity crisis. Whenever a deci-
sion has to be made, information must be gathered and analyzed, then a
decision must be reached. In a crisis, these tasks could take significant time,
during which the situation can worsen. It is also possible that, under crisis
conditions, the government could make an inappropriate choice based on
disorganized or missing information. Biosecurity under the rule of law can
facilitate decision-making processes by improving the gathering and flow of
information, and by clearly articulating the parameters and factors that go
into a given decision. The law can pre-determine such things as who is "in
charge" and accountable, which level of government and agency takes the
lead, and how the various services can coordinate their response.
The rule of law combats these potential problems by prospectively
establishing information gathering and analysis systems. Surveillance sys-
tems can be established to systematically collect, organize, and distribute
vital health information in a rational and efficient manner. In a crisis situa-
tion, it will be much easier to make difficult decisions involving, for exam-
ple, quarantine, evacuation, or rescue if the information is readily available
and lines of communication are clear, tested, and resilient.
Furthermore, this information can be used to continuously update
biosecurity plans as circumstances change. For example, as population dis-
tribution in a region changes, evacuation thresholds and protocols can be
altered. Should an emergency arise, government officials will have the most
accurate data and decision-making tools available. In this context, informa-
tion systems created and organized within the rule of law can serve as a
reflective updating mechanism. Biomedical knowledge is always changing.
New threats emerge, and new treatments are developed. With the use of
104 See generally Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform Hearing Before the S.
Comm. On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
David M. Walker, Comptroller gen. of the U.S.), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/
_files?030806Walker.pdf; Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama Before the Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/
files/ccLibrary-Fies/Fiename/000000000656/Huse%20Seect%2OKatrina%20Response%2
Olnvestigation%20Committee%2OHolds%20Hearing%20on%20Hurricane%20Katrina%20P
reparedness%20and%2OResponse.pdf.
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prospectively established information gathering systems, policy-makers can
incorporate the most recent knowledge into the established plans and struc-
tures. This strategy avoids creating a stagnant response system.
Coordination of Action. Coordination of actions poses a similar set
of issues. First, as indicated above, it is important to define prospectively
who is responsible for which set of activities. Biosecurity emergencies re-
quire immediate responses. Struggling over which level of government,
which agency, or which official is responsible only wastes time, allowing
the emergency to spread, or its effects to worsen.
Second, responding to a biosecurity emergency is a complicated
endeavor, requiring the coordination of different levels of government (lo-
cal, state, federal, and even international). It is vital to define the responsi-
bilities of each tier, so none of the necessary responses are neglected. This
approach also ensures that actions by the various levels of government are
not at odds with each other and fit together as an integrated security and
public health response to the threat.
V. CONCLUSION
This article attempts to convey some of the profound changes that
have transformed biosecurity governance. Space constraints have prevented
us from a detailed exploration of all biosecurity policy issues. We have out-
lined some themes analyzed in our forthcoming book and focused on the
importance of embedding biosecurity policy in the rule of law.
This article and our book explain the analytical reasons for our posi-
tion, but we have personal motivations as well. From our scholarly and pro-
fessional pursuits in different aspects of security and public health before
September 11 and the anthrax attacks, we recall the complacency about the
terrorist and bioterrorist threats that existed before those terrible months in
the autumn of 2001. Crises replaced complacency, and out of the crises has
come an opportunity to re-conceptualize biosecurity policy. This challenge
has to be translated into action through new strategies and policies. Part of
that commitment, we believe, must include the importance of having the
rule of law stimulate both the imagination and the practice of biosecurity
efforts in the twenty-first century.
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